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Electronic voting has security concerns due to potential errors, lack of paper documentation, and vulnerability to hacking. Different types of electronic voting systems have varying levels of security and privacy, and the use of different machines in the same election can skew results. Universal systems are needed to prevent disenfranchisement.
Electronic voting or e-voting uses an electronic interface to collect and categorize votes. Since the introduction of electronic voting, debate has raged over the security of the technologies used, out of concern that some voters may be disenfranchised due to electronic errors. The security of e-voting ultimately depends on a number of factors, and verification is made difficult by manufacturers who wish to keep proprietary secrets such as the software they use.
In any election, election officials want to gather accurate results as quickly as possible and tabulate them with minimal errors. Inevitably, a certain amount of error will creep into any voting system, whether it’s a sophisticated touchscreen machine or a wastebasket that voters fill with rocks to support a candidate. The goal is to ensure that as many voters as possible are represented in the final election. As people expect election results as soon as possible, officials also have to work quickly.
A major concern with electronic voting is that it is vulnerable to hacker penetration. A number of computer engineers have demonstrated these vulnerabilities by hacking into testing machines to show how they can tamper with final grade tallies or change the way the system records grades. In regions where electronic voting machines are used, evidence suggests that votes were cancelled, duplicated or misinterpreted by the voting machine.
Software and hardware errors are also a problem, as any computer owner knows. Many systems lack systems to deal with crashes or hardware damage, so it is possible for a voter to cast their vote and that vote to be lost later due to a power outage or glitch in the software . Many voting rights advocates are also concerned about the lack of paper documentation with many electronic voting systems. A fully electronic system does not print a receipt or hard copy of the votes cast, making it impossible to check for errors.
The type of electronic voting system used also makes a big difference. An optical scanning machine, for example, scans paper ballots filled out by voters. The machine has to interpret the obscured ovals to count the votes, and the voter is usually not presented with a verification of the votes cast to ensure that the machine is reading the ballot correctly. Voter privacy is also compromised by such machines, as many poll workers routinely review ballot papers before scanning them to ensure they are filled in correctly.
An entirely electronic system such as a touchscreen voting machine or Internet voting may be more secure in terms of voter privacy, but it also lacks an auditable paper trail and is very vulnerable to manipulation. This has been a major concern in regions that use different types of electronic voting machines in the same election, as some campaigners fear elections could be skewed by faulty machinery. For example, if you use machines with a 7% error rate in an area that favors candidate A and machines with a 2% error rate in an area that favors candidate B, the election will be skewed in favor of candidate B. Some people believe this amounts to disenfranchisement and would like to see universal systems in place to prevent it.
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